of renewed tension between Malays and Chinese.

Resettlement has changed the political balance of power within the Federation by giving the Chinese a stronger political position. In the new villages, the State and Federation governments encouraged the development of locally elected village councils, thus creating a Chinese political vehicle which had not previously existed. The new citizenship laws, the organization of Home Guard units, and the opening of the police and military units to Chinese recruits have all worked to bring the Malay Chinese more actively into the political scene. The traditional Malay domination of politics and administration is now threatened by the newly enhanced political status of the Chinese and by an increased Chinese interest in political affairs. But it should be noted that, in taking measures to provide the Chinese an attractive alternative to Communism, the Malay authorities have also opened up what may become an additional source of racial friction rather than a contribution to orderly progress toward self-government and independence.8

Gandhian Socialism in India

BY MARSHALL WINDMILLER

Indian socialists in 1951 claimed that their party enjoyed more support than all other opposition parties put together, but when the results of the 1951-52 general elections became known it was apparent that the claim had been grossly over-optimistic. Although the Party's popular vote was the second largest in the country, the Socialists won only twelve seats in the national House of the People as against twenty-seven won by the Communists. In the state assembly contests the Socialists won 126 seats against the Communists' 193, and some index to the Party's disappointment is found in the number of candidates' financial deposits forfeited: 1,056, the largest number of all the parties.3

Although official Socialist publications rationalized the election defeat, it was apparent that the Party had suffered a demoralizing blow. In May 1952 a special convention of the Party was convened in Pachmarhi, Madhya Pradesh, to analyze the results of the general elections and to formulate a new strategy. Rammanohar Lohia, the conference chairman, described the political situation as "an incipient polarization between the Congress Party and the Communist Party" and warned that this trend would have to be stopped "before it bears foul fruit and paralyzes the nation's mind and activity."2 To arrest this polarization Lohia suggested a strategy which recognized the existence of three political groups other than the Congress, Socialists and Communists. The first were the revolutionary Marxists such as the Forward Bloc, the Revolutionary Socialist Party, the Peasants' and Workers' Party and the Revolutionary Communist Party. The second were the Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party (KMPP—an offshoot of Congress), the Scheduled Castes Federation and others that had "blurred the line between radicalism and conservatism." And the third group was composed of the reactionary and communal parties such as the Hindu Mahasabha, the Ram Rajya Parishad and the Jan Sangh. Any relations with the last group were rejected, but Lohia suggested a political line that would "consolidate groups represented by the second type and elements of the first

8 See Dobby, loc. cit., p. 173.
with the Socialist Party, so that this party becomes in
time a clean instrument of Indian socialism and radical-
ism and is able to absorb all other radical elements when
they split away from their various organizations." This
strategy was unanimously incorporated into the politi-
cal program adopted at Pachmarhi.

The Pachmarhi convention adjourned on May 27,
1952. On June 1, Jayaprakash Narayan, the General
Secretary, issued a joint statement with J. B. Kripalani,
leader of the KMPP, with whom he had been meeting
in Delhi. The statement announced that both parties
would function in parliament as a single parliamentary
party, and that "every effort is to be made about a
merger of the two parties." Future associations with
communal groups or the Communist Party was specific?
ally disavowed, thereby posing an interesting problem
for the Madras section of the KMPP which, led by
the hoary ex-premier, T. Prakasam, had entered into
a united front with the Communists in February. The
actual merger was finally consummated in September,
and Prakasam quit the alliance with the CP in Decem-
b...
today. One group led by Rammanohar Lohia and Madhu Limaye holds that the function of an opposition Party is to oppose, and that the PSP should continue the policy of maintaining itself at equal distances from the Congress and the Communists. The other group argues that on certain nation-building projects the Praja Socialists must extend their cooperation to the party in power. The ideological justification for this was sprung as a surprise in Asoka Mehta's report as General Secretary to the Party's special convention at Betul in June, 1953. Mehta argued that "the compulsions of backward economy tend to push towards totalitarianism or timidity. The dilemma can be resolved first by so broad-basing the government that it gets power to move forward, because opposition is driven to the fringes; and second, by strengthening the forces of pluralism in authority and initiative."9 Mehta argued that "nation-building activities and partisan politics have to be demarcated" and concluded by saying, "I believe we shall fail to evoke response if our attitude, implicit if not explicit, is that reconstruction of the country cannot begin till our Party comes to power." Accordingly Mehta gives enthusiastic support to the Bhoodan movement as offering an opportunity for the better elements of all parties to cooperate in solving the land problem, and also as creating an atmosphere in which cooperation in other nation-building activities can be expanded. Mehta's appraisal of Bhoodan, however, is not without a certain Marxian realism, for he argues that the movement's innocuousness helps to neutralize the landlord class, giving the party an opportunity to build a strong base among the peasantry by constructive work. He implies that a frontal assault on the landlords at the present juncture would be fruitless and that now the Socialist movement must be organized for struggles that will come later. Bhoodan is a useful device for this purpose.

On the other hand, Jayaprakash Narayan's wholesale dedication to Bhoodan appears to be totally un-Marxian. He says that in the old days he and other Socialists "used to prick holes in Mahatma's ideas as not scientific, not revolutionary and so on," but he has come to realize that neither the Communists nor the Socialists were ever capable of building a mass movement. Only Gandhi was able to do that, and today "if there is any workable, concrete program for the redistribution of land, it is Vinoba's. If you go on trying to interpret Bhoodan according to Marxist principles, you will be nowhere."10

In December of 1953 Narayan wrote an article in Janata which was widely reprinted under the title "Ideology of the PSP." In it he argued that Communism and socialism had failed and that the only true revolution was a "revolution in the values of life."

"Most of us (he stated) think that it is only when we capture power that we shall be able to build up socialism by legislation and state power. If we persist in this legalistic concept of the social revolution, I have no doubt we are going to suffer the same disillusionment as socialists in the West.

"Gandhism does not concentrate on the capture of power, nor depend on the power of the State, but goes to the people and helps them to effect the revolution in their lives and consequently revolution in the life of the community . . . . "Socialism wishes to advance by setting class against class, Gandhism by cutting across classes . . . . by so bringing the classes together that there are no class distinctions left."11

Since most of the ideological justification for cooperation with the government developed after the Nehru-Jayaprakash talks, a suspicion developed that it was all just a smoke-screen for further efforts at "office seeking." If long-range cooperation with Congress were really possible, argued Madhu Limaye, then the two parties might as well merge. However, when the old Socialist Party quit the Congress in 1948 it was due to fundamental differences which were irreconcilable. Now who had changed, the PSP or the Congress, or was the original assumption wrong? Limaye has suggested that much of the impetus for closer cooperation with the government came from suggestions by the Yugoslav Communists with whom the PSP is on friendly terms. The Yugoslavs "want us to be in the government so as to achieve a more fruitful cooperation with us," Limaye explained, but since they did not understand the role of Nehru and the Congress in Indian politics, their advice should not be taken too seriously.12

New Ideological Elements

Despite competent opposition from Lohia, Limaye and others, the prestige of Jayaprakash and the intellect of Asoka Mehta have been pushing the Party toward the acceptance of an ideology in which these new elements clearly stand out: (1) the concept that Gandhian

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12 Report of the Special Convention of the Praja Socialist Party (Betul), p. 21. See also Madhu Limaye, "Democracy and the Party System," Janata, Vol. VIII, No. 21 (June 21, 1953), p. 7-8. The Socialists have been on good terms with the Yugoslavs for some time. In June of 1952 a group of Indian Socialists concluded a month's visit to Yugoslavia as the guests of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav League of Communists. Former Yugoslav ambassador to India, Josa Vilfan, had friendly contacts with Asoka Mehta during his stay in India.
economic theory and methods of political struggle are more applicable to Indian conditions than Marxian ideas; (2) the concept that the state is not a good instrument for building a socialist society; and (3) the corollary that the party system does not provide "an adequate framework for the democratic requirements of the masses." Mehta and Narayan now talk in terms of building a "socialist movement" rather than a Socialist Party.

Although there is a large area of agreement concerning the first of the above principles, the second and third are vigorously opposed by the Lohia-Limaye wing of the Party. Lohia certainly agrees that India still has much to learn from Gandhi, and as the champion of the idea of a decentralized economy based on a technology of small-unit machines he appreciates the Gandhian cottage industry concept. Furthermore, Lohia's address at Pachmarhi in 1952 by calling for greater emphasis on Gandhian principles may have been responsible in large part for the Gandhian trend which he opposes today. But his primary concern continues to be the political arena, and he still hopes to avoid the Communist-Congress polarization of Indian politics which he described at Pachmarhi. The current Gandhian swing of the Party and particularly its emphasis on Bhoodan tend, in Lohia's view, to advance this polarization. "Bhoodan is one good program among many," says Lohia, "but if it is taken as the sole program it does harm. Furthermore, such a common program embracing various political parties should not be misused to blur the outlines of these parties..."

Limaye makes a similar point:

"There would not be any political party in the real sense of the term if prophets, like Vinoba, succeeded in formulating goals and programs of national reconstruction, and furthermore, were able to persuade all sections of public opinion to accept them. If this were done, then the withering away of government will not be far away. But this clearly is in the realm of fantasy and not in the realm of what is possible... the human race has not as yet discovered a better antidote to dictatorship than elections and the party system."

Certain factors have combined to accelerate the drift toward Gandhism and away from party politics. One was the 1952 merger when a large number of Gandhians from the KMPP came into the party. Most of these had no strong attachment to Marxian or socialist ideas, if indeed any at all. Kripalani, once president of the Congress, founder and head of the KMPP and now Chairman of the PSP, is a good example. T. Prakasam, now first minister of Andhra State, is another. Prakasam's case is interesting for his recent actions have been responsible, to a large degree, for the present confusion in Socialist ranks.

The Role of Prakasam

Prakasam has been known for many years as the "Lion of Andhra" because of his long and vigorous campaign for the creation of a separate state for India's Telugu-speaking population. In June of 1951, along with Kripalani and other dissident Congressmen he helped form the KMPP and became a member of its executive. When the KMPP merged with the Socialist Party, Prakasam went along, albeit without any great display of enthusiasm. When it became clear in early 1953 that the Government of India was prepared to set up the new State of Andhra, it was natural that the public should expect the eighty-one year old "Lion" to become Chief Minister. Because of his unique status the PSP National Executive gave Prakasam a free hand to arrange a coalition government with the Congress.

No party held a majority in the new legislature, but the Congress held the largest number of seats. As October 1, 1953, the date of the new state's inauguration, approached, Sanjeeva Reddy, leader of the Congress Party in Andhra, announced that the Chief Minister would have to be a Congressman. At this point Prakasam asked the National Executive of the PSP to release him from Party responsibility in order that he could become Chief Minister. The National Executive naturally refused. On September 20th Prakasam and Sanjeeva Reddy met Nehru in New Delhi, and on September 26th Prakasam resigned from the PSP, made his peace with Congress and prepared to become Chief Minister.

When Prakasam formed his cabinet he gave the finance portfolio to Tenetti Viswanatham, a Praja Socialist and his long-time colleague. Viswanatham stated that he was entering the cabinet on the strength of the PSP's announced willingness to form a coalition. The National Executive was not long in making it clear that the defection of Prakasam had changed the situation, and that while the Andhra PSP might support the government, it could not enter into a coalition. Viswanatham was given the choice of quitting the government or quitting the Party, and like Prakasam, he chose the latter alternative. Ten of the sixteen PSP members of the Andhra Assembly defied the National Executive and supported Viswanatham. The remaining six rallied under the leadership of P. V. G. Raju, but it was obvious that the Andhra PSP had been seriously damaged.

The Andhra episode damaged morale in the PSP all over India. Many Socialists were extremely bitter...
over what they regarded as a deliberate attempt by the Congress to destroy the PSP in Andhra. Since the affair had at least the tacit consent of Prime Minister Nehru, this bitterness was not directed toward Prakasam alone. The argument that Congress was a party with which the PSP could profitably cooperate was considerably weakened.

Elections in Travancore-Cochin

There is little doubt that the events in Andhra were to a large degree responsible for the Party's position on the general elections in Travancore-Cochin. Meeting in late October 1953, the National Executive decided "to avoid three cornered contests," which obviously meant that it would negotiate some sort of an electoral arrangement with the Communist-dominated United Front of Leftists (UFL). It is necessary to read only a few of the Party's many anti-Communist statements since 1939 to realize that this was a significant departure from the traditional policy.

The terms of the electoral alliance provided that the anti-Congress vote would not be split as it had been in the 1951-52 elections. Of the 117 seats in the state legislature the Congress was contesting 115. Opposing the Congress, the PSP was contesting 39 seats, the Communists 35 and other leftists and independents 59. There were straight contests in as many as 73 constituencies.

If the UFL won the election it could form a government only with the support of the PSP, so a UFL victory would pose a great dilemma for the Socialists. If they participated in a coalition they would be helping to strengthen the hand of the Communists whom most Socialists regard as the major enemy of democracy in India. If they declined to help form a government, they would be in the position of having asked the voters to vote for instability and probable "President's Rule" from the Center. They could hardly agree to a coalition with the Congress for whose defeat they have been willing to sacrifice their long-standing principles of anti-Communism. This problem was so disturbing that some Socialists expressed the hope that the Congress would sweep the polls.

It was the question of relations with other parties that generated the most heat at the PSP annual conference in Allahabad, December 29-30, 1953. Previously at the Betul convention in May a fifteen-man policy commission had been created to draft a new statement of policy for the Party which would clearly define its attitude toward coalitions and alliances. The commission rendered a detailed report (drafted by Lohia) which was made available for intra-party discussion before the conference and was adopted unanimously at Allahabad. The report states the Party's creed in terms of what it will do when it achieves governmental power. Since office-holding is implicit in every word, the idea of a socialist movement as opposed to a socialist party appears to have been pushed into the background. Bhoo dan is barely mentioned, and the theme of extra-political cooperation with the government along lines advocated in Asoka Mehta's "compulsions of backward economy" thesis is clearly dismissed. The report states:

"... the PSP must ever be confident that it can serve the nation only to the extent that it strengthens itself for the attainment of its aims. General calls of cooperation keep a people at a low level of political consciousness and result generally in strengthening the government party. Governments which do not merit people's cooperation are more profuse in inviting the people to cooperate than those that attract such cooperation through their measures. The PSP warns the people against such appeals." Thus the Allahabad policy statement is a clear victory for those who wanted to keep Indian socialism in the political arena.

Attitudes Towards Government Formation

On the question of alliances and coalitions the statement indicated that the PSP did not contemplate the formation of a coalition government at the Center "except in the event of a national emergency," leaving it to the National Executive with the consent of the National Conference to decide what constitutes a national emergency. On the state level the commission recommended that the Party could cooperate to form a stable government, either by support or actual coalition on the basis of the government's declared policy "commonly accepted." Such cooperation could last "only as long as the Government works in the interests of the nation." "In a situation when a Government has become unpopular," continued the report, "the PSP may make common cause with opposition parties in order not to prop up indefinitely a Government which has lost the confidence of the people." Regarding elections the report stated that the Party could "enter into an electoral adjustment with a party or parties opposing the ruling party . . . with the purpose of avoiding triangular fights." This was an obvious

15 Congress has governed in Travancore-Cochin since the 1951-52 elections by means of a shaky coalition with the Travancore Tamilnad Congress, a group of Congress dissidents from the Tamil speaking areas in the south. When this group declined to support a confidence motion in September, 1953, the legislature was dissolved and new elections were ordered.


17 Ibid.
endorsement of the Travancore-Cochin alliance and Madhu Limaye opposed it vigorously with an amendment for deletion. "We want to fight the Congress and the Communists simultaneously," he said. "We cannot even temporarily suspend our political struggle against either. The Party should therefore fight only in those constituencies where it enjoys mass support and leave the rest." Lohia, although he agreed with Limaye, had decided to compromise, so he spoke against Limaye's amendment and it was defeated by a substantial majority.

It is unlikely that the Allahabad conference marked the end of the ideological conflict which has weakened the Party since the general elections. The Party is indebted to the personality of Jayaprakash Narayan for a great deal of its public support and he is apparently not enthusiastic about the Allahabad thesis. Although still a member of the National Executive he continues to move away from Party responsibilities. He left for an extended Bhoodan tour in Bihar immediately after the conference and would not interrupt it to make an election tour in Travancore-Cochin, despite the fact that his presence there was needed to offset the Congress advantage gained by Nehru's tour. As Narayan moves away there will be a natural tendency to lure him back by concessions to his Gandhian orientation, and this will tend to cause ideological confusion. If he should sever his connections with the Party, the result would probably be chaotic.

Anything but a clear-cut victory for the Congress in the Travancore-Cochin elections is bound to generate further controversy in the PSP, for the local PSP leadership is not always in agreement with the National Executive on party strategy.18 Ingredients of another Andhra are readily apparent. Whether the Party could survive another major defection is doubtful.

Asia's Women Speak for Themselves: A Review Article

BY BENJAMIN H. KIZER

Three hundred years hence historians, looking back on this turbulent age, may well conclude that one revolution that was achieved with least sound and fury, but was permanent and most far-reaching, has been the world-wide emancipation of women. It is not yet complete even in the United States. In many lands, it has still only just begun, but it is everywhere in progress, generally moving fastest in lands where women have traditionally been most subordinate, notably in some of the Asian countries where the subjection of women has for so many centuries been taken for granted.

That the revolutionary ferment in the Far East has strikingly advanced the status of women is illustrated by the publication in recent years of autobiographies of three young women of the Far East, an Indian, a Chinese and a Japanese. The public acceptance of these autobiographies provides in itself some measure of the speed with which women have moved toward equality with men in these countries. In most of the centuries of Asian civilization preceding this generation, such a disclosure by women of the Far East of their personal lives would have been unthinkable. Now, it happens with little fanfare, with an absence of astonishment that marks how far women of the Far East have gone in little more than a generation. The two older books, East of Home by Santha Rama Rau, Fifth Chinese Daughter by Jade Snow Wong1 and the more recent Daughter of the Pacific2 by Yoko Matsuoka are each intrinsically interesting for the insight they give us into the lives of Asian women in this transitional period. But they are still more valuable as examples of the grace and ease with which Asian women are accepting their new status.

In Daughter of the Pacific Yoko Matsuoka shows herself as a victim of the tensions between East and West. Her seven years in the United States, gaining a Western education, had enabled her to believe that Japan was wrong in attacking Pearl Harbor. But she was constrained to accept Japan's war with a country that was a second home to her. As she puts it, "It was easier to collapse with the whole framework than to be unscrupulously rational." This book gives a revealing

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